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_______________ 
 
OPINION OF THE COURT 
_______________ 
 
KRAUSE, Circuit Judge. 
 
The Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (“FDCPA”) 
protects consumers from abusive, deceptive, or otherwise 
unfair debt collection practices.  15 U.S.C. § 1692(a).  It applies 
to “debt collectors,” defined alternatively as those engaged “in 
any business the principal purpose of which is the collection of 
any debts” and those “who regularly collect[]” debts “owed or 
due another.”  Id. § 1692a(6).  This appeal concerns only the 
first definition and requires us to determine whether an entity 
that acquires debt for the “purpose of . . . collection” but 
outsources the actual collection activity qualifies as a “debt 
collector.”  The District Court held that it does, and we agree: 
an entity that otherwise meets the “principal purpose” 
definition cannot avoid the dictates of the FDCPA merely by 
hiring a third party to do its collecting.  We therefore will 
affirm.  
 
I. Background 
 
A. Factual Background 
Appellant Crown Asset Management (“Crown”) is a 
purchaser of charged-off receivables, that is, accounts on 
which a consumer has stopped paying the debt owed.  When 
Crown purchases an account, it determines if the debtor has 
filed for bankruptcy or is deceased.  If neither is the case, 
Crown does not collect on the account itself; rather, it refers 
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the charged-off receivable to a third-party servicer for 
collection or it hires a debt collection law firm to file a 
collection lawsuit on its behalf.  Although Crown does not 
contact consumers directly, it principally derives revenue from 
liquidating the consumer debt it has acquired. 
 
In this case, Appellee Mary Barbato obtained a 
consumer credit card from GE Electric Capital Corporation 
and GE Money Bank (collectively “GE”) in 2007.  She made 
her last payment on the account in November 2010, leaving an 
outstanding balance.  GE subsequently charged off that balance 
and, after a number of sales and assignments, Crown purchased 
Barbato’s debt.  Pursuant to its standing service agreement 
with collection agency Turning Point Capital, Inc. (“Turning 
Point”), Crown then referred that debt to Turning Point for 
collection.   
 
Crown’s service agreement with Turning Point 
explained that Crown was seeking “to procure certain 
collection services” from Turning Point, and Turning Point 
was agreeing to “undertake collection on each Account placed” 
with it by Crown.  App. 376.  In addition, the agreement said 
that Crown had the “sole and absolute discretion,” App. 378, 
as to which accounts it would forward, that Crown’s obligation 
to pay Turning Point was contingent upon Turning Point’s 
success, and that Crown could establish settlement guidelines 
from which Turning Point would have to obtain permission in 
order to deviate.   
 
Pursuant to this agreement, Turning Point sent Barbato 
a collection letter in February 2013, identifying itself as a 
“National Debt Collection Agency” and Crown as its client.  
Turning Point also called Barbato and left her two voicemail 
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messages.  For its part, Crown did not have any direct 
communication with Barbato regarding her account, nor did it 
review or approve the letter sent to her by Turning Point.  
When Barbato filed for bankruptcy, however, Crown recalled 
Barbato’s account from Turning Point and subsequently closed 
it.   
 
B. Procedural Background 
Several months later, after Turning Point was absorbed 
by Greystone Alliance, LLC (“Greystone”), Barbato filed a 
state court complaint against Greystone, alleging that it had 
violated the FDCPA.  And after Greystone removed the action 
to federal court, Barbato filed an amended complaint in which 
she added Turning Point and Crown as defendants and alleged 
that each was a “debt collector” as defined by the FDCPA.1  
Turning Point was served but never answered.  Barbato 
eventually dismissed both Turning Point and Greystone from 
the action, leaving only Crown as a defendant.  
 
Barbato and Crown subsequently filed cross-motions 
for summary judgment on, among other issues, the question 
whether Crown was a debt collector.  Barbato did not argue 
                                              
1 Although of limited relevance for this appeal, the 
specific conduct that Barbato alleged violated the FDCPA was 
(1) that Turning Point left her voicemail messages without 
disclosing that the calls were from a debt collector, as required 
under 15 U.S.C. § 1692e(11), and (2) that Turning Point’s 
letter neglected to inform her how to properly exercise her 
validation rights, as required under 15 U.S.C. § 1692g.  
Barbato purported to bring this latter claim on behalf of a 
putative class of Pennsylvania residents. 
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that Crown satisfied the “regularly collects” definition, i.e., 
that it “regularly collect[ed]” debts “owed or due another.”  15 
U.S.C. § 1692a(6).  Rather, she argued that Crown was a “debt 
collector” because: (1) it purchased debts when they were in 
default, which, under then-controlling precedent, was a 
prerequisite to being considered a “debt collector” as opposed 
to a “creditor”2—statuses we had deemed mutually exclusive 
under § 1692a(6), see F.T.C. v. Check Inv’rs, Inc., 502 F.3d 
159, 171 (3d Cir. 2007)—and (2) it satisfied the statute’s 
“principal purpose” definition because the principal purpose of 
its business was the collection of those defaulted debts, even if 
it hired third-party debt collectors to do the collecting.  15 
U.S.C. § 1692a(6); App. 209–10 (citing Pollice v. Nat’l Tax 
Funding, L.P., 225 F.3d 379, 403–04 (3d Cir. 2000)).  Crown 
countered that, regardless of the default status of the debt, 
Barbato could not prove it fit the “principal purpose” definition 
because it took no collection action towards her and its 
principal purpose was not the collection of debt but, rather, its 
acquisition.   
 
Siding with Barbato on these issues, the District Court 
held that Crown was “acting as [a] ‘debt collector’” because: 
(1) it acquired debts like Barbato’s when they were in default 
and (2) the summary judgment record supported that Crown’s 
“principal purpose” was the “collection of ‘any debts.’”  
Barbato v. Greystone All., LLC, No. 3:13-CV-2748, 2017 WL 
1193731, at *10 (M.D. Pa. Mar. 30, 2017).  As to the second 
ground, the Court found little difference between collecting on 
                                              
2 The statute defines “creditor” as “any person who 
offers or extends credit creating a debt or to whom a debt is 
owed.”  15 U.S.C. § 1692a(4). 
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charged-off receivables and referring charged-off receivables 
to third-party independent servicers for collection.  Instead, 
given that Crown purchased debt, that ninety to ninety-five 
percent of that debt came from consumers, and that Crown 
referred all of that debt out for collection, the District Court 
concluded that “Crown’s principal purpose is to acquire 
accounts in ‘default’ for the purpose of collection.”  Id.  The 
District Court nevertheless denied Barbato’s motion for 
summary judgment, holding that she had not established that 
Crown was vicariously liable for Turning Point’s conduct 
because (1) in the District Court’s view, vicarious liability 
could be imputed to Crown in these circumstances only if the 
agent too was a “debt collector,” and (2) the evidence in the 
record was insufficient to hold that Turning Point was a debt 
collector under the FDCPA.  The Court granted the parties 
leave to file renewed motions for summary judgment to 
address Turning Point’s status as a debt collector. 
 
While these proceedings continued in the District Court, 
however, the Supreme Court issued a decision that prompted 
Crown to seek reconsideration of the District Court’s ruling 
that it was a “debt collector.”  In Henson v. Santander, 
Consumer USA Inc., in interpreting the “regularly collects” 
definition and deciding whether the entity there “regularly 
collect[ed] . . . debts owed or due another,” 15 U.S.C. § 
1692a(6), the Supreme Court held that it was irrelevant 
whether the debt acquired and sought to be collected was in 
default; instead, it held “[a]ll that matters is whether the target 
of the lawsuit regularly seeks to collect debts for its own 
account or does so for ‘another,’”  137 S. Ct. 1718, 1721, 1724 
(2017).  Construing that language to apply to § 1692a(6) 
generally, Crown urged that it could no longer be considered a 
debt collector, even under the “principal purpose” definition, 
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because it too was collecting debts on its own behalf and not 
for another.  The District Court disagreed, holding that Henson 
pertained only to the “regularly collects” definition of “debt 
collector” and did not affect its holding that Crown was a debt 
collector under the “principal purpose” definition.  See Barbato 
v. Greystone All., LLC, No. CV 3:13-2748, 2017 WL 5496047, 
at *1, *9–*10 (M.D. Pa. Nov. 16, 2017).   
 
Nevertheless, the District Court certified its decision for 
interlocutory appeal and presented a controlling question of 
law to this Court: “whether Henson requires a finding that 
Crown is not a debt collector in this case when it was a third-
party buyer of the debt, and the debt was in default at the time 
it purchased it.”  App. 34.  Crown then filed a petition for 
permission to file the interlocutory appeal and to appeal the 
District Court’s denial of its motion for reconsideration, which 
we granted. 
 
II. Jurisdiction and Applicable Standards 
 
The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1331, and we have jurisdiction over this interlocutory appeal 
under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b).  When reviewing an interlocutory 
appeal under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b), we exercise plenary review 
over the question certified.  Florence v. Bd. of Chosen 
Freeholders of Cty. of Burlington, 621 F.3d 296, 301 (3d Cir. 
2010).  The scope of our review, however, is not limited to the 
question set forth in the certification motion but, rather, 
includes any issue fairly included within the certified order.  
See Yamaha Motor Corp., U.S.A. v. Calhoun, 516 U.S. 199, 
205 (1996) (“As the text of § 1292(b) indicates, appellate 
jurisdiction applies to the order certified to the court of 
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appeals, and is not tied to the particular question formulated by 
the district court.”). 
 
 “We review a denial of a motion for reconsideration for 
abuse of discretion, but we review the District Court’s 
underlying legal determinations”—its denial of summary 
judgment to Crown in this case—“de novo and factual 
determinations for clear error.”  Howard Hess Dental Labs. 
Inc. v. Dentsply Int’l, Inc., 602 F.3d 237, 246 (3d Cir. 2010).  
Summary judgment is appropriate only where there is no 
genuine issue as to any material fact.  Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). 
 
III. Discussion 
 
On appeal, Crown contends that it does not qualify as a 
“debt collector” under the “principal purpose” definition for 
three reasons: First, the Supreme Court’s decision in Henson 
undermined our prior precedent that would render it a debt 
collector.  Second, its principal purpose is the acquisition—not 
the collection—of debt, and a faithful interpretation of the 
statute requires that we distinguish between the two.  And 
third, the legislative history demonstrates that Congress 
intended to regulate the proverbial “repo man,” not a “passive 
debt owner” like Crown.  Appellant Br. 32.  We begin with a 
brief overview of the FDCPA and, with that context for 
Crown’s arguments, address—and reject—each in turn. 
 
A. The FDCPA  
Congress enacted the FDCPA in 1977 “to eliminate 
abusive debt collection practices by debt collectors” and “to 
insure that those debt collectors who refrain from using abusive 
debt collection practices are not competitively disadvantaged.”  
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15 U.S.C. § 1692(e).  It provides a private right of action 
against debt collectors who violate its provisions.  15 U.S.C. § 
1692k; see also Brown v. Card Serv. Ctr., 464 F.3d 450, 453 
(3d Cir. 2006).  “As remedial legislation, the FDCPA must be 
broadly construed in order to give full effect to these 
purposes.”  Caprio v. Healthcare Revenue Recovery Grp., 
LLC, 709 F.3d 142, 148 (3d Cir. 2013). 
 
“To prevail on an FDCPA claim, a plaintiff must prove 
that (1) she is a consumer, (2) the defendant is a debt collector, 
(3) the defendant’s challenged practice involves an attempt to 
collect a ‘debt’ as the [FDCPA] defines it, and (4) the 
defendant has violated a provision of the FDCPA in attempting 
to collect the debt.”  St. Pierre v. Retrieval-Masters Creditors 
Bureau, Inc., 898 F.3d 351, 358 (3d Cir. 2018) (quoting 
Douglass v. Convergent Outsourcing, 765 F.3d 299, 303 (3d 
Cir. 2014)).  The only element at issue in this case is the 
second—whether Crown qualifies as a “debt collector.” 
 
As noted, the statute defines “debt collector” as any 
person (1) “who uses any instrumentality of interstate 
commerce or the mails in any business the principal purpose of 
which is the collection of any debts” (the “principal purpose” 
definition), or (2) “who regularly collects or attempts to collect, 
directly or indirectly, debts owed or due or asserted to be owed 
or due another” (the “regularly collects” definition).3  15 
                                              
3 The statute also provides two other definitions of “debt 
collector,” neither of which is relevant here: “any creditor who, 
in the process of collecting his own debts, uses any name other 
than his own which would indicate that a third person is 
collecting or attempting to collect such debts” and “any person 
who uses any instrumentality of interstate commerce or the 
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U.S.C. § 1692a(6).  The statute thus provides two separate 
paths to establishing an entity’s status as a “debt collector.”  
See Henson, 137 S. Ct. at 1721.   
 
As we recently had occasion to remark, the debt 
collection industry has changed since Congress enacted the 
FDCPA in 1977, and the simple creditor-debt collector duo has 
been complicated by the advent and growth of debt buying.  
See Tepper v. Amos Fin., LLC, 898 F.3d 364, 366 (3d Cir. 
2018).  With the proliferation of debt buying have come 
questions about the boundaries of the statute’s definitions.   
 
In Henson v. Santander, the Supreme Court clarified the 
“regularly collects” definition.  There, Santander Bank 
purchased loans once they were already in default and sought 
to collect on them.  137 S. Ct. at 1720.  Focusing on the plain 
language of the statutory definition at issue, the Court held that 
a third-party buyer of debt that seeks to collect debt owed to it 
does not fit the second definition because it does not “regularly 
seek to collect debts ‘owed . . . another.’”  Id. at 1721.  It 
rejected the petitioners’ arguments that either the origin of the 
debt or the default status of the debt had any bearing on that 
analysis.  As to the debt’s origin, it reasoned that the statutory 
language did not suggest that “whether the owner originated 
                                              
mails in any business the principal purpose of which is the 
enforcement of security interests.”  15 U.S.C. § 1692a(6).  
Excluded from the definition’s reach are, among others, a 
creditor’s officers and employees who collect debts for the 
creditor, an entity collecting a debt it originated, and an entity 
collecting a debt it obtained that was not in default at the time 
of purchase.  Id. §§ 1692a(6)(A), (F).   
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the debt or came by it only through a later purchase” was 
relevant.  Id.  The Court similarly saw no basis in the text for 
concluding that an entity that obtains debts after default 
automatically qualifies as a “debt collector” under the 
definition.  See id. at 1724.  “All that matters,” the Court 
concluded, “is whether the target of the lawsuit regularly seeks 
to collect debts for its own account or does so for ‘another.’”  
Id. at 1721.  Relevant for our purposes, the Court explicitly 
declined to address whether such debt buyers could 
nevertheless qualify as debt collectors under the “principal 
purpose” definition.  Id. 
 
B. Henson and Third Circuit Precedent 
Crown’s primary argument on appeal is that Henson 
abrogated our prior precedent such that it no longer qualifies 
as a “debt collector” under the statute.  Crown contends this is 
so for two reasons: first, because Henson renders it a creditor, 
not a debt collector, and the two statuses are mutually 
exclusive; and second, because Henson rejected the so-called 
“default” test on which we relied, thereby undermining “the 
very foundation” of our prior caselaw.  Appellant Br. 30.  
Crown overstates the effect of Henson. 
 
We need not dwell on Crown’s first argument because 
our recent decision in Tepper v. Amos forecloses it.  In Tepper, 
the defendant was a company whose “sole business [wa]s 
purchasing debts entered into by third parties and attempting 
to collect them.”  898 F.3d at 369.  The defendant claimed that 
because it met the statutory definition of creditor—it was 
trying to collect debts it owned and was thus an entity “to 
whom [the] debt is owed”—it could not also be a debt 
collector.  Id. at 371 (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(4)).  Like 
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Crown, the defendant based this argument on Third Circuit 
precedent that characterized the two statuses as “mutually 
exclusive.”  Id. (citing Check Inv’rs, 502 F.3d at 173); see also 
Pollice, 225 F.3d at 403.  Until Henson, as we explained, we 
relied on the “default” test to determine whether an entity was 
a creditor or a debt collector: either the entity obtained the debt 
before default and was a creditor or it acquired the debt 
afterwards and was a debt collector.  Tepper, 898 F.3d at 366–
67.  Given the binary nature of default status, an entity could 
be only one or the other.  But, we observed, Henson rejected 
the “default” test, id. at 367, and with it, the basis for treating 
the terms “debt collector” and “creditor” as mutually exclusive.  
Following the Supreme Court’s direction to hew more closely 
to the statutory definitions, we concluded that “an entity that 
satisfies both [definitions] is within the Act’s reach.”  Id. at 
371.  The same is true here. 
 
As to Crown’s second argument about Henson’s overall 
effect on our caselaw, it simply proves too much.  While it is 
no doubt true that Henson abrogated the default test on which 
we relied to distinguish between creditors and debt collectors 
and that it clarified the scope of the “regularly collects” 
definition of debt collector, Henson did not address the other 
prong of § 1692a(6)—the wholly separate “principal purpose” 
definition.  To the contrary, the Court conducted a close textual 
analysis of the “regularly collects” definition, deriving from 
that portion of the statute—which requires the entity to 
“collect” debt “owed or due another”—that “[a]ll that matters 
is whether the target of the lawsuit regularly seeks to collect 
debts for its own account or does so for ‘another.’”  137 S. Ct. 
at 1721.  That requirement, however, does not appear in the 
“principal purpose” definition, and the Supreme Court went 
out of its way in Henson to say that it was not opining on 
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whether debt buyers could also qualify as debt collectors under 
that prong of § 1692a(6).  See id.  
 
But we have previously opined on this question—and in 
similar circumstances.  In Pollice v. National Tax Funding, 
L.P., a debt buyer, National Tax Funding L.P. (“NTF”), 
purchased delinquent municipal tax and utility claims from the 
government.  225 F.3d at 385.  Like Crown, NTF had no direct 
contact with debtors; rather, it outsourced all of its collection 
activities to others.  Id. at 386.  We concluded that NTF was a 
debt collector both because it purchased debt in default—a fact 
Henson has since rendered irrelevant—and also because “there 
[was] no question that the ‘principal purpose’ of NTF’s 
business is the ‘collection of any debts,’ namely, defaulted 
obligations which it purchases from municipalities.”  Id. at 
404.  The fact that someone else did the actual collecting did 
not deter us from concluding that NTF was a “debt collector” 
given that “NTF exist[ed] solely for the purpose of holding 
claims for delinquent taxes and municipal obligations.”  Id. at 
404 n.27 (emphasis added).  True, Pollice predated Henson, 
but for the reasons we explain below, we continue to find its 
logic persuasive. 
 
C. Statutory Interpretation 
To determine whether Crown is a “debt collector” under 
the “principal purpose” definition, we look first to the plain 
meaning of the statutory text.  See S.H. ex rel. Durrell v. Lower 
Merion Sch. Dist., 729 F.3d 248, 257 (3d Cir. 2013).  The text 
states that “any person who uses any instrumentality of 
interstate commerce or the mails in any business the principal 
purpose of which is the collection of any debts” is a “debt 
collector.”  15 U.S.C. § 1692a(6).  Focusing on the word 
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“collection,” which it defines as “the act or process of 
collecting,” Crown argues that the “principal purpose” 
definition applies only to those that engage in “overt acts of 
collection” by interacting with consumers—not entities like 
Crown that purchase debt and outsource the collection.  
Appellant Br. 25, 31, 33.   
 
As much as Crown might wish that it were otherwise, 
nothing suggests that the definition is so limited.  An entity 
qualifies under the definition if the “principal purpose” of its 
“business” is the “collection of any debts.”  “Principal” is 
defined as “most important, consequential, or influential,” 
Principal, Webster’s Third New International Dictionary 1802 
(1976) (“Webster’s Third”), and “purpose” is defined as 
“something that one sets before himself as an object to be 
attained : an end or aim” and “an object, effect, or result aimed 
at, intended, or attained,” id. at 1847.  Thus, an entity that has 
the “collection of any debts” as its “most important” “aim” is 
a debt collector under this definition.  While it is true that 
“collection” can be defined as “the act or process of 
collecting,” it can also be defined as “that which is collected.”  
Collection, Random House Dictionary of the English 
Language 290 (1973).  So defined, the focus shifts from the act 
of collecting to what is collected, namely, the acquired debts.  
As long as a business’s raison d’être is obtaining payment on 
the debts that it acquires, it is a debt collector.  Who actually 
obtains the payment or how they do so is of no moment.   
 
The statutory context of the “principal purpose” 
definition casts further doubt on Crown’s argument that 
Congress meant to limit it to only those entities that actively 
collect from consumers.  See Allen ex rel. Martin v. LaSalle 
Bank, N.A., 629 F.3d 364, 367 (3d Cir. 2011) (“If the plain 
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language fails to express Congress’ intent unequivocally . . . 
we will examine the surrounding words and provisions in their 
context.”) (citing Tavarez v. Klingensmith, 372 F.3d 188, 190 
(3d Cir. 2004)).  In contrast to the “regularly collects” 
definition, where Congress explicitly used the verb “to collect” 
in describing the actions of those it intended the definition to 
cover, in the “principal purpose” definition, Congress used the 
noun “collection” and did not specify who must do the 
collecting or to whom the debt must be owed.4  15 U.S.C. § 
1692a(6); see also Tepper, 898 F.3d at 370.  Thus, by its terms, 
the “principal purpose” definition sweeps more broadly than 
the “regularly collects” definition, and we must presume that 
the “legislature says . . . what it means and means . . . what it 
says.”  Henson, 137 S. Ct. at 1725 (quoting Dodd v. United 
States, 545 U.S. 353, 357 (2005)).   
 
In a plain language argument of its own, Crown retorts 
that to find that it qualifies under the “principal purpose” 
definition even though it outsources its collection activities 
would be to read the word “indirectly” into the statute where it 
does not appear.  This is especially problematic, Crown 
contends, because the “regularly collects” definition does 
specify that an entity can collect “directly or indirectly,” while 
Congress omitted this qualifier from the “principal purpose” 
definition.   
                                              
4 At both oral argument and in its supplemental briefing, 
Crown argued that the word “collection” is a verb.  It is not.  It 
is a noun.  See Collection, Webster’s Third at 444 (denoting 
with the abbreviation “n” that the word being defined is a 
noun). 
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We are unpersuaded.  Again, the fact that the “regularly 
collects” definition employs a verb and the “principal purpose” 
definition employs a noun is critical.  In the “regularly collects” 
definition,  the “directly or indirectly” qualification is 
necessary because one could reasonably interpret “collect” to 
refer to only direct efforts to collect—it is, after all, “a verb that 
requires action.”  Appellant Reply Br. 15 (citation omitted).   
 
The “principal purpose” definition, however, needs no 
such qualification.  “Collection” by its very definition may be 
indirect, and that is the type of collection in which Crown 
engages: it buys consumer debt and hires debt collectors to 
collect on it.5  The existence of a middleman does not change 
the essential nature—the “principal purpose”—of Crown’s 
business.  As Barbato points out, Crown could buy debt for the 
charitable purpose of forgiving it, or it could buy debt for the 
purpose of reselling it to unrelated parties at a profit.  In both 
                                              
5 Although not addressed by the District Court or the 
focus of the parties’ arguments on appeal, Barbato has 
suggested that Crown itself collects debt because it is the 
named plaintiff in many collection lawsuits.  Because Crown’s 
litigation efforts did not give rise to this appeal and we 
conclude that Crown otherwise satisfies the “principal 
purpose” definition, we need not address this argument.  We 
note, however, that Crown’s answer to it—that its litigation 
efforts are irrelevant because its counsel, not Crown itself, does 
the collecting by, for example, drafting the pleadings—is in 
tension with our precedent, e.g., Pollice, 225 F.3d at 404–05 
(recognizing that a debt collector may be held vicariously 
liable for the conduct of its attorneys), and squarely refuted by 
our holding today.   
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of those cases, the entity’s “principal purpose” would not be 
collection.  But Crown does neither of those things.  Indeed, 
the record reflects that Crown’s only business is the purchasing 
of debts for the purpose of collecting on those debts, and, as 
Crown candidly acknowledged at oral argument, without the 
collection of those debts, Crown would cease to exist.  In short, 
Crown falls squarely within § 1692a(6)’s “principal purpose” 
definition.   
 
D. Crown’s Purpose and Legislative History 
Argument 
Finally, Crown argues that the legislative history of the 
FDCPA demonstrates that Congress did not intend for the 
statutory definition of “debt collector” to apply to a “passive 
debt owner” like itself but only to a repo man who was 
personally hounding debtors to hand over the money they owe.  
Appellant Br. 32.  This argument is flawed in two respects. 
 
First, it proves too much.  There is no doubt that 
“[d]isruptive dinnertime calls, downright deceit, and more 
besides drew Congress’s eye to the debt collection industry.”  
Henson, 137 S. Ct. at 1720.  But even if the purpose of the 
statute was to reach repo men, that purpose is furthered by 
recognizing Crown as a debt collector under § 1692a(6).  
Unlike a traditional creditor, such as a bank or a retail outlet 
that has its own incentive to cultivate good will among its 
customers and for which debt collection is one of perhaps 
many parts of its business, an independent debt collector like 
Crown has only one need for consumers: for them to pay their 
debts.  As market-based incentives go, that makes it far more 
like a repo man than a creditor and gives it every incentive to 
hire the most effective repo man to boot.   
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Second, while the Supreme Court acknowledged in 
Henson that “[e]veryone agrees that the term embraces the repo 
man,” id., the language on which Congress settled sweeps 
more broadly to include “any business the principal purpose of 
which is the collection of any debts,” 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(6) 
(emphasis added), without regard to whether that entity 
delegates its collecting activities.  The statute is clear, and 
Crown’s argument fails for this reason as well: “[R]ecourse to 
legislative history or underlying legislative intent is 
unnecessary when a statute’s text is clear and does not lead to 
an absurd result.”  In re Phila. Newspapers, LLC, 599 F.3d 298, 
317 (3d Cir. 2010) (quoting Hay Grp., Inc. v. E.B.S. 
Acquisition Corp., 360 F.3d 404, 406 (3d Cir. 2004)).   
 
E. Issues for Remand 
Of course, our holding that Crown is a debt collector 
does not answer the ultimate question of liability, which turns 
here on principles of vicarious liability.  As the District Court 
recognized, “when Congress creates a tort action, it legislates 
against a legal background of ordinary tort-related vicarious 
liability rules,” Barbato, 2017 WL 1193731, at *12 (quoting 
Meyer v. Holley, 537 U.S. 280, 285 (2003)), and we have relied 
on traditional agency principles in holding parties vicariously 
liable under the FDCPA, see Pollice, 225 F.3d at 404–05, as 
have other Courts of Appeals in the context of analogous 
remedial statutes, see, e.g., Jones v. Federated Fin. Reserve 
Corp., 144 F.3d 961, 965 (6th Cir. 1998) (applying agency 
principles to determine vicarious liability under the Fair Credit 
Reporting Act). 
 
As Crown’s ultimate liability for the acts of Turning 
Point was not the question certified in this interlocutory appeal 
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nor the focus of the parties’ briefing, we will leave that issue 
for the District Court’s consideration in the first instance.  By 
way of guidance on remand, however, we offer two brief 
observations.  First, to the extent Crown argues that the District 
Court was obligated to find that Crown exerted actual control 
over Turning Point in order to be held vicariously liable, 
Crown misunderstands the tenets of agency law and our 
precedent.  See Meyer, 537 U.S. at 285–86 (explaining that the 
principal-agent relationship requires that the principal either 
control “or [have] the right to direct or control” the agent) 
(emphasis added); see also Janetos v. Fulton Friedman & 
Gullace, LLP, 825 F.3d 317, 326 (7th Cir. 2016) (interpreting 
Pollice to mean that vicarious liability need not be based “on a 
showing of actual control over the specific activity alleged to 
violate the [FDCPA]”). 
 
Second, in inviting further development of the record on 
Turning Point’s own status as a “debt collector,” the District 
Court assumed that Crown could not be held vicariously liable 
for the acts of an agent under the FDCPA unless the agent 
qualified as a “debt collector” in its own right.  Barbato, 2017 
WL 1193731, at *13.  But our case law imposes no such 
requirement; to the contrary, we have focused on whether the 
principal qualifies as a debt collector because “an entity which 
itself meets the definition of ‘debt collector’ may be held 
vicariously liable for unlawful collection activities carried out 
by another on its behalf.”  Pollice, 225 F.3d at 404.  And as we 
explained in Pollice, and we reinforce today, this is “a fair 
result because an entity that is itself a ‘debt collector’—and 
hence subject to the FDCPA—should bear the burden of 
monitoring the activities of those it enlists to collect debts on 
its behalf.”  Id. at 405.   
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IV. Conclusion 
 
For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the District 
Court’s order denying reconsideration of its summary 
judgment decision and will remand for further proceedings 
consistent with this opinion.  
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